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Aboriginal-Crown Treaty-Making
in Canada:
A Many-Splendoured Thing1
Jim R. Miller

Introduction
One of the frustrating things about trying to teach treaty-making as an element of
Canadian history is that one’s audience, like the country itself, is highly regionalized. On the prairies, students come to the class knowing there are “Numbered
Treaties” and resistant to the idea that there are any other treaties, or any other
categories of treaties, than those made in their own region. I suspect that students
in the Maritimes fixate on eighteenth-century treaties, Quebec students focus on
treaties between 1701 and the 1760s, and Ontario students have an unhealthy
fascination with treaties of the first half of the nineteenth century. Happiest of
all are students in British Columbia, who have been raised to believe that “B.C.
doesn’t have treaties.”
The reality is, of course, that the history of Aboriginal-Crown treaty-making in
Canada is far richer and more diversified than the treaty history of any one region.
There have been four phases of treaty-making: commercial compacts, peace and
friendship treaties, territorial treaties, and modern treaties that are either comprehensive claims settlements or separately negotiated agreements of recent decades.
Moreover, there is another vast field of treaties between First Nations of which
non-Native students and scholars are almost totally ignorant. And, as I will argue
later, there is further complexity in the fact that historical writing about treaties
and other matters can vary widely from discipline to discipline. It is worth taking
a few minutes to explore the richness of this many-splendoured thing—treatymaking in Canada.
Commercial compacts, which were once thought to be the vanished artifacts
of a bygone era when fur was king, have in fact been with us through Canadian
history and are found among us still. It is true that commercial agreements of
a unique character did spring from economic ties in the fur trade, beginning as
early as the 1670s. Both French and English fur traders understood that their
small numbers and lack of expertise made them dependent on First Nations to
locate, take, process, and bring to market the furs that the newcomers sought. For
example, as early as 1680, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) officials in London
issued orders to their representative in Hudson Bay concerning how he was to
conduct his dealings with First Nations who controlled the area in which he hoped
——
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to establish a trading post.2 Thanks to research by Arthur Ray and a few others, we
know that the HBC in particular entered into pacts with First Nations in Rupert’s
Land that made the commerce possible, using Aboriginal protocols that involved,
whether the Europeans understood it or not, entering kin relationships with their
North American hosts. As a Montreal-based fur trader memorably complained,
“There is no end to relationship among the Indians,”3 because the First Nations
had to make strangers kin before they could trade with them with confidence.
Aboriginal protocol and kin-making were features that commercial compacts
shared with the second form of treaty-making that emerged simultaneously after
contact. In fact, it was only the European partners in these early treaties that
thought there were two distinct forms of agreement. First Nations did not distinguish between commercial compacts and treaties of friendship as the Europeans
did, because for them both ententes were outgrowths, or aspects, of the kinship
relations they entered into with the newcomers. As a Six Nations diplomat put it
in 1735, “Trade & Peace we take to be one thing.”4 Whether it was Champlain
and the Montagnais chief Anadabijou in northern Quebec in 1603 or the Five
Nations and Corlaer, as they called the English governor, at Albany, the foundational protocols they went through created many ties: kin, commercial partners,
friends, and, if necessary, allies. Peace and friendship treaty-making entered a
new and more formal phase in the eighteenth century when the Great Peace of
Montreal of 1701 and the Mi’kmaq treaties of 1726, 1752, and 1760–61 emerged
to take centre stage, at least in our historiography. But it is important to recognize
that they were all founded on the practice of Aboriginal kin-making protocol,
a mechanism for making friends of strangers. One of the striking features of
this phase of treaty-making was the way in which some Europeans and EuroAmericans, men like Frontenac and Sir William Johnson, became masters and
enthusiastic practitioners of indigenous rituals involving the pipe, speech-making,
feasting, and wampum.
Out of the final paroxysm of the peace and friendship phase, the Seven Years’
War, emerged the basis for the third and most enduring of the eras of CrownAboriginal treaty-making in Canadian history. Commercial compacts and peace
and friendship relationships did not disappear, but beside them, and soon supplanting them, there emerged land-related agreements based on the requirements of the
Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation, which Britain promulgated to
tidy up awkward details of the peace that ended the showdown between France
and Britain, concluded with half a dozen paragraphs that were intended to reassure
France’s First Nations allies that Britain meant them no harm. It attempted to
do this by declaring out of bounds to settlers all lands west of the Appalachian
Mountains and south of Rupert’s Land that were not included in existing colonies
such as Quebec to be lands “reserved to them … as their Hunting Grounds.”
Moreover, the Proclamation said that, should the First Nations who occupied
these lands wish to dispose of some of them, they could lawfully do so only to
the Crown “at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians to be held
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for that Purpose by the Governor.”5 The aim of the “Indian clauses” at the end of
the Royal Proclamation was to stop the land frauds that had caused so much strife
west of the Thirteen Colonies. Their effect, though, was to lay down a Crownsanctioned procedure for making Crown-Aboriginal territorial treaties that would
provide access for Europeans to First Nations lands. As is also well known now,
Sir William Johnson, Indian superintendent in the northern colonies, converted
a unilateral imperial document into an Aboriginal-Crown treaty by means of the
Treaty of Niagara of 1764.6
Though never scrupulously observed by officers of the Crown, the Royal
Proclamation initiated a succession of phases of treaty-making that dealt with
Indian lands from southern Ontario to the Rocky Mountains and as far north as
the southern portions of the Northwest Territories by 1921. The Government of
Canada does not recognize an important group of these agreements—the Upper
Canadian treaties made between 1784 and the late 1830s—as treaties. The government’s position is that these are not treaties, but indentures or simple contracts.
That position can only be sustained if one concentrates solely on the language of
the government’s version of the agreements that eventually were published.7
If, on the other hand, one looks at the accounts of the Crown’s treaty commissioners of the meetings at which the agreements were fashioned, one finds a much
richer and more complicated picture. At least until the Robinson Treaties of 1850,
the making of these so-called indentures occurred within a framework of First
Nations protocol. So, for example, the opening speech by treaty commissioner
James Givins in 1811:
Children—I am happy to see you, and I return thanks to the Great Spirit, that has been
pleased to enable us to meet at this place in good health. Children—I am sent by Your
Father the Governor to make an agreement with you for the purchase of a small piece of
land, the plan of which I now lay before you … Children—As your women and children
must be hungry, I have brought some of Your Great Father’s Bread and milk, and some
ammunition for your young men, which I will give you before we hear this.8

The speech-making and present-giving continued the use of traditional protocol.
By 1850, however, these markers of traditional treaty-making had almost
completely disappeared, and in the making of the Manitoulin Island Treaty of
1862 they were nowhere in evidence.
It is striking that First Nations protocols re-emerged into prominence in the
1870s in the making of the southern Numbered Treaties. Largely because First
Nations performed the rituals and partly because the Crown’s representatives
were accompanied by and dependent upon a number of Hudson’s Bay Company
veterans, the smoking of the pipe, kinship rhetoric, feasts, and also equestrian
displays surrounded the talks. These phenomena linked the events on the Plains
in the 1870s with both the twin treaty phases of the northeast woodlands and the
persistent protocol of the Rupert’s Land fur trade. Moreover, in the Numbered
Treaties one other element was unusually prominent: both sides made much of
involving the deity in the proceedings. First Nations leaders talked of the Great
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.

APR Volume 7.indb 5

1/13/10 12:13:37 PM

  /  Part One: Historic Treaties and Modern Meaning

Spirit and often offered the pipe, while government treaty commissioners,
Alexander Morris especially, frequently talked of both the Christian god and the
Great Spirit as witness to all they were doing. While Morris understood the importance of the pipe ceremony, it is unlikely that he appreciated that First Nations
held that its use converted bilateral negotiations into three-way talks that included
the Great Spirit. Equally significant was the fact that the agreements that resulted
from such multilateral parleys were covenants, agreements to which the deity was
a party. The dissonance between the government’s view of the Numbered Treaties
that conveyed ownership of land, and First Nations understanding of them as
covenants that established a relationship between First Nations and the Crown that
was to be renewed regularly and adjusted is striking. That disagreement has been
a major cause of the problems that Canada and First Nations have had agreeing
upon and properly implementing treaties ever since the late 1870s.
As had been the case in Upper Canada, the longer territorial treaty-making
went on in the West and the North, the weaker the attachment of the Crown to
traditional understandings of treaty became. By Treaty 9 in northern Ontario
in 1905, for example, the only remnant of the old protocol of kin-making that
remained was the “feast” that occurred at the end of deliberations. By now this
was a pretty poor affair, and treaty commissioners clearly were puzzled by the
fact that their First Nations treaty partners took the gatherings quite seriously. By
the final territorial treaty, the Williams Treaties of 1923, traditional protocol was
nowhere to be seen or heard. Canada would follow that mockery of treaty-making
by shutting down treaty negotiations for half a century. It was not until the James
Bay Cree and Nisga’a got the state’s attention by means of court decisions in 1972
and 1973 that the federal government rediscovered its ability to make treaties with
the First Nations whose lands and resources southern entrepreneurs coveted. The
Calder decision of 1973 led to the creation of a claims process that included a
comprehensive claims settlement mechanism by 1974. The interim injunction the
James Bay Cree obtained in 1972 resulted from difficult negotiations in the James
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) of 1975. The JBNQA is generally
regarded as the first modern Canadian treaty, and comprehensive claims settlements have the same legal and constitutional status as territorial treaties. These
events ushered in the modern treaty-making era.
The fourth era of treaty-making has involved three forms of agreement:
comprehensive claims settlements, large treaty agreements such as Nunavut and
Nisga’a, and the more localized territorial treaties that are beginning to emerge
from the British Columbia Treaty Commission process. It is probably unnecessary to underline the fact that traditional kin-making protocol is either not associated with these agreements, or, if it is, that the government has no understanding
of its significance.
Looking back over the last four centuries, then, we can appreciate that Canada
has had—and continues to have—and will always have—a lengthy, diverse,
and rich treaty-making history. Commercial compacts and peace and friendship
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treaties were joined in the latter part of the eighteenth century by territorial treaties
that have gone through numerous transformations and are with us still in several
forms. Clearly, we have a big job to do to teach our students, policy-makers, and
Canadians more generally about the diversity and richness of this legacy, about its
contemporary relevance, and about its importance for the future.
If that history is not complex enough, consider another dimension to the
diversity that typifies our understanding of Crown-Aboriginal treaty-making. I
am, of course, referring to the differing approaches to interpreting the history of
treaties that predominate in First Nations and Euro-Canadian communities. The
former emphasizes both the oral and documentary record, while the latter tends to
take seriously only its own form of history. That issue is sufficiently well known
that I need not pursue it here.
There is another difference about understanding treaties that is not as well
known, but needs to be understood if we are to begin to make our way towards
consensus on the meaning of treaties. I refer to the difference between history
and legal history. By “legal history” I do not mean what James Clifton scorned
as “law office history” described as “the selective use and suppression of historical and anthropological evidence, systematic distortion of facts in support of a
preconceived ‘theory of the case,’ the dexterous manipulation of judicial and
public sentiments, perfectly astounding hyperbole, and the most outstanding
fabrications” that the anthropologist witnessed in land claims litigation.9 Nor do I
mean the legal history that academics in law faculties produce. Scholars such as
Sid Harring, Hamar Foster, and Kent McNeil, to mention only a few, do historical analyses that are similar in methodology and historiographical contribution to
their colleagues in arts departments.10 Rather, I refer to the more understandable
differences in how historians construct the past, and how lawyers and judges,
most especially of the Supreme Court of Canada, fashion an authoritative view
of the past through judicial decisions in cases in which history is a major factor.
I hasten to add that I mean no disrespect to my legal and judicial brothers and
sisters in pointing out this difference of approach.
Law and the judicial system have a more specific and immediate job to do than
does history, and they go about it differently. As Mr. Justice Ian Binnie famously
said on behalf of the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada’s first Marshall
decision in 1999, the courts face real problems that are dependent on historical
evidence and must reach a decision in the short term:
The courts have attracted a certain amount of criticism from professional historians for
what these historians see as an occasional tendency on the part of judges to assemble a
“cut and paste” version of history …
While the tone of some of this criticism strikes the non-professional historian as intemperate, the basic objection, as I understand it, is that the judicial selection of facts and
quotations is not always up to the standard demanded of the professional historian, which
is said to be more nuanced. Experts, it is argued, are trained to read the various historical
records together with the benefit of a protracted study of the period, and an appreciation
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of the frailties of the various sources. The law sees a finality of interpretation of historical events where finality, according to the professional historian, is not possible. The
reality, of course, is that the courts are handed disputes that require for their resolution
the finding of certain historical facts. The litigating parties cannot await the possibility of
a stable academic consensus. The judicial process must do the best it can.11

The courts must rule.
Leaving aside the question of whether academic history ever produces stable
consensuses, Justice Binnie had a point. Confronted by a real problem of interpretation and faced with competing reports from historians, courts must come
up with a plausible resolution of the history on which the issues at trial turn.
The contending lawyers naturally address their presentations to that necessity,
and craft briefs intended to lead the court to conclude what is in their client’s
interest. But necessity brings problems. As a group of Australian scholars has
observed, for most judges “the past consists of a single continuous narrative, and
the question is whether enough elements in the narrative have been revealed for
the rest to be filled in. This approach ignores the complex relationship between
the past and the present.”12
Moreover, judges and lawyers do not always recognize that their training
inclines them to a particular approach that can be limiting when it comes time to
sift conflicting interpretations. To put the point simply, legal training shapes litigators and judges who are focused on the written word, in contrast to historians’
training, which brings them to believe that the written word without its context
is literally meaningless. Please note: I am not referring to the distinction between
written and oral evidence, but between text and context. To put the point even
more simplistically, it is sometimes said that law is about text, and history is about
context. In complex Aboriginal law cases, the limitation imposed by legal orientation to the written word can have severe consequences.
A few examples of what is meant are in order. Note, for instance, that Justice
Binnie used the report of the Crown’s historical expert to uphold the contention
of the First Nation party in the case. Another example would be the ruling by Mr.
Justice Emmett Hall in Calder in 1973 that held, among many other things, that
the Royal Proclamation applied to British Columbia.13 Now, the language of the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 is not crystal clear on the point, but it seems to say,
to a historian at least, that Rupert’s Land, the Hudson’s Bay Company territory,
was excluded. To assume the British government meant anything else would be
peculiar, given the existence of the 1670 Hudson’s Bay Company charter that
purported to give title to Rupert’s Land to the commercial company. In any event,
it is unlikely the Proclamation’s framers could have intended it to apply to British
Columbia because British explorers would not reach its shores for another fifteen
years. Not even the eighteenth-century British claimed they could acquire territory
by possession retroactively.
It is also instructive to consider how the Supreme Court of Canada has evolved
in its treatment of historical evidence. Judges consider the expert opinions of
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historians and other scholars as “extrinsic evidence.” In other words, the past
as explained by historians is “not inherent, intrinsic, or essential” to the issue at
hand.14 As late as its 1988 decision in R. v. Horse, the Supreme Court of Canada
declared that it had
some reservations about the use of this material as an aid to interpreting the terms of Treaty
No. 6. In my view the terms are not ambiguous. The normal rule with respect to interpretation of contractual documents is that extrinsic evidence is not to be used in the absence of
ambiguity; nor can it be invoked where the result would be to alter the terms of a document
by adding to or subtracting from the written agreement … Extrinsic evidence is generally
inadmissible when it would, if accepted, have the effect of adding to, varying or contradicting the terms of a judicial record, a transaction required by law to be in writing, or a
document constituting a valid and effective contract or other transaction.15

The Supreme Court moved towards considering historical evidence only very
slowly. Even before the decision in Horse that contemplated considering extrinsic
evidence only where the law was ambiguous, it had prepared the ground for greater
receptiveness to historical evidence. In a 1983 decision the Court had declared that
the words of the treaty must be given the sense that they would naturally have held
for the parties at the time.16 That, obviously, put into the Court how the historical
actors who made the treaties would have viewed them given the context in which
they acted.
Rather more helpful for indigenous litigants, two years later the Supreme Court
added important rules of treaty interpretation in R. v. Simon.17 In ruling on a case
concerning the Mi’kmaq Treaty of Halifax (1752), the Court said, “The principles
of international treaty law relating to treaty termination were not determinative
because an Indian treaty is unique and sui generis.” Besides holding that Aboriginal treaties were unique and could not be judged by rules developed in another
area of law, in Simon the Court also adopted an American rule: “treaties and
statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions
resolved in favour of the Indians … In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), it
was held that Indian treaties ‘must … be construed, not according to the technical
meaning of [their] words … but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.’ ”18
In Horseman, a treaty case with which the Supreme Court had to wrestle in
1990, it added new interpretive principles.
These treaties were the product of negotiation between very different cultures and the
language used in them probably does not reflect, and should not be expected to reflect,
with total accuracy each party’s understanding of their effect at the time they were entered
into. This is why the courts must be especially sensitive to the broader historical context
in which such treaties were negotiated. They must be prepared to look at that historical
context in order to ensure that they reach a proper understanding of the meaning that
particular treaties held for their signatories at the time ... Indian treaties must be given the
effect the signatories obviously intended them to have at the time they were entered into
even if they do not comply with to-day’s formal requirements. Nor should they be undermined by the application of the interpretive rules we apply today to contracts entered into
by parties of equal bargaining power.19
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At the same time, “we should give it [the treaty] an interpretation, if this is possible
on the language, which will implement and be fully consistent with that commitment.”20
In the same year, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Sioui case established
beyond doubt that the highest court was prepared to consider historical evidence.
The case turned on the answer to the question, was the document that the appellants relied upon, the Murray Treaty of 1760, a treaty within the meaning of
section 35 of the constitution or not? Among the contemporary official sources
that were vital to answering that question were the Acts of Capitulation of Quebec
and Montreal of 1759 and 1760, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the Treaty
of Paris (1763) by which France ceded Quebec to Great Britain. Also considered were portions of the Jesuit Relations, The Papers of Sir William Johnson,
E. B. O’Callaghan’s Documents relative to the Colonial History of New York,
the published journals of military officers, and Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law
of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature (1760). To answer the question
about the Murray Treaty, the Court probed the documents to determine if Great
Britain, General Murray, and the Huron who entered into it “had capacity to sign;”
“whether the parties actually did enter into a treaty;” and what the nature of the
rights guaranteed in the document and what their “territorial application” was.
In commencing their analysis, the justices reiterated their endorsement in the
1985 R. v. Simon of something the court had said earlier in R. v. White and Bob,
which also dealt with the question of whether a document was a treaty. The 1964
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal had affirmed “that the courts
should show flexibility in determining the legal nature of a document recording a
transaction with the Indians. In particular, they must take into account the historical context and perception each party might have as to the nature of the undertaking contained in the document under consideration.” In short, context mattered,
and had to be considered.21
A final example of the different ways in which the courts and historians operate
might be found in the Supreme Court of Canada’s maxim “the honour of the
Crown.” If Aboriginal-Crown treaty-making in Canada is a many-splendoured
thing, then “the honour of the Crown” is an entity that has undergone a Shakespearean “sea-change into something rich and strange.”22 The notion entered
Canadian jurisprudence in the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Sparrow. In
defining the grounds on which an Aboriginal right—and soon, by extension, a
treaty right—might lawfully be extinguished, the Court said, “The way in which
a legislative objective is to be attained must uphold the honour of the Crown and
must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history
and policy, between the Crown and Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.”23 Fair enough:
the Court was laying down a standard that legislatures would be expected to meet or
else see their legislation struck down by the courts.
And then the metamorphosis began. In the Supreme Court’s R. v. Badger
decision in 1996, the bench broadened the application:
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First, it must be remembered that a treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises
between the Crown and the various Indian nations. It is an agreement whose nature is
sacred. See R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at p. 1053; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 387, at p. 401. Second, the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealing with
Indian peoples. Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact
upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the
integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfill its promises.
No appearance of “sharp dealing” will be sanctioned. See Sparrow, supra, at pp. 1107–8 and
114; R. v. Taylor (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 367.24 (emphasis added)

And then in the first Marshall decision Justice Binnie wrote:
This appeal should be allowed because nothing less would uphold the honour and integrity
of the Crown in its dealings with the Mi’kmaq people to secure their peace and friendship,
as best the content of those treaty promises can now be ascertained … An interpretation
of events that turns a positive Mi’kmaq trade demand into a negative Mi’kmaq covenant
is not consistent with the honour and integrity of the Crown … The trade arrangement
must be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning and substance to the oral promises
made by the Crown during the treaty negotiations.25 (emphasis added)

Scattered through the majority judgment were similar declarations: “the concept
of a disappearing treaty right does justice neither to the honour of the Crown
nor to the reasonable expectations of the Mi’kmaq people;” and “Here, if the
ubiquitous officious bystander had said, ‘This talk about truckhouses is all very
well but if the Mi’kmaq are to make these promises, will they have the right to
hunt and fish to catch something to trade at the truckhouses?’, the answer would
have to be, having regard to the honour of the Crown, ‘of course;’” and “I do not
think an interpretation of events that turns a positive Mi’kmaq trade demand into
a negative Mi’kmaq covenant is consistent with the honour and integrity of the
Crown;”26 and, finally:
While I do not believe that in ordinary commercial situations a right to trade implies any
right of access to things to trade, I think the honour of the Crown requires nothing less in
attempting to make sense of the result of these 1760 negotiations.27

The “honour of the Crown” had entered jurisprudence in 1990 as a standard for
judging the constitutionality of legislation, and by 1999 it was remade into a
canon of historical interpretation. What began in 1990 as a sensible requirement
for judging legislatures’ actions by the standard of “the honour of the Crown”
was transmuted by 1996 and 1999 into an interpretive principle that seemed to
mean that historical events were to be interpreted as though the Crown had acted
honourably. The difference in the Supreme Court positions in 1990 and 1999 is
a measure of the distinction between “legal history” and “history.” In cases such
as these it is hard to disagree with the judge of the Australian Federal Court who
wrote, “Judges do not engage in historiography. They resolve present day disputes
and in so doing they adhere to reasonably well understood conventions. Unless
you understand this you misunderstand how they use history. For the most part,
they are simply history’s bower-birds, somewhat idiosyncratically collecting odds
and ends for some present legal history.”28
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Aboriginal-Crown treaty-making in Canada has evolved through a number of
phases and given rise to a multitude of interpretations. The diversity and complexity of the treaty-making tradition give it its historical depth and richness, while
complicating the deliberations of lawyers and judges who have to apply this
history to specific legal issues. It is, truly, a many-splendoured thing. No doubt
it will continue to be for a long time to come. The complexity of the Canadian
treaty-making tradition is one more difficult lesson we have to teach our students,
policy-makers, and the public.
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